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The aim of the present paper is to analyze the pass-through from exchange rate 
to inflation in Brazil from 1980 to 2002. Initially, we developed a model of a profit-
maximizing firm based on the pricing-to-market approach presented by FEENSTRA 
and KENDAL (1997). In order to adapt the model to the Brazilian reality, we considered 
the following aspects: (i) the firm sells its product both in the domestic market – where 
it has some pricing power – and in the foreign market – where it is a price-taker; (ii) 
costs are a function of the exchange rate; (iii) the degree of openness is included in the 
demand equation. Results show that the Kalman Filter yields better results than linear 
models with time-invariant parameters and that the inflationary environment and the 
exchange rate regime perceived by the agents affect the degree of pass-through. We 
can observe a reduction in the pass-through to consumer price indices (IPCA and IGP-
DI) after the implementation of the Real plan, and a more intense reduction after the 
adoption of the floating exchange rate regime in 1999. These results are in line with 
other estimates presented in the literature. The pass-through to wholesale prices, 
however, is relatively constant and its levels are close to one throughout the period. 
This also seems to be a consistent result if we consider a small (price-taking) economy 
in the foreign market. 
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I – Introduction 
 
There have been several studies about the effects of exchange rate movements on the 
economy, especially on prices. However, most of these studies are concerned with developed 
economies, which behave differently from the Brazilian economy. Moreover, few of these studies 
focus on Brazil, and many of them fail to use a longer study period that includes the years prior to 
the price stabilization brought about by the Real Plan. Furthermore, new econometric techniques 
developed in recent years have made it possible to analyze the relationship between exchange 
rate and prices, although such alternatives remain underexplored even in industrialized countries.  
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of CNPq. E-mail:msp@ufrgs.br The effects of exchange rate movements on prices in different economic scenarios are of 
paramount importance in order for us to evaluate whether they depend upon the macroeconomic 
environment, as this information is relevant for monetary policy decisions. Evidence suggests that 
such relation exists; an example is the different pass-through behavior of developed and emerging 
economies. According to CALVO and REINHART (2000), emerging economies showed a pass-
through from exchange rate to inflation about four times higher than that of developed economies, 
and the variance of inflation compared to exchange rate variation was 43% for emerging 
economies and 13% for developed ones. The authors conclude that there is a lower tolerance to 
exchange rate fluctuations in emerging economies. 
The impact of an exchange rate devaluation on prices is both direct, through an increase in 
import prices, and indirect, through the effects on aggregate demand. In the first case, the increase 
results from the share of imports in the price index as well as from the rise in input costs. On top of 
that, devaluation also places pressure for nominal wages to rise, due to the change in real wage. In 
the second case, the effects on aggregate demand are due to (i) changes in the relationship 
between foreign and domestic prices, (ii) the effects on interest rates, since the foreign capital 
movements are affected, and (iii) the wealth effect, since there may possibly be a relevant number 
of firms that hold foreign exchange positions. The change in the expenditure structure (between 
domestic and imported goods) will be greater the higher the price-elasticity of exports and imports, 
and the degree of openness of the economy (LOSCHIAVO and IGLESIAS, 2002). 
AMITRANO, GRAUWE and TULLIO (1997) describe the following three stages in the pass-
through of exchange rate devaluation to domestic inflation: 
1) Pass-through to import prices: since there is a second-order effect on profit, which 
increases the average revenue and decreases the quantity demanded, the increase in profit 
depends on the demand elasticity. As the prices constitute a mark-up over costs, exporters 
might not increase them, especially if there are menu costs as well as expectations that 
devaluation is temporary; 
  2) Pass-through from import prices to domestic prices: the degree of pass-through 
depends on the characteristics of the economy: the more open an economy is (i.e., stronger 
presence of imported goods), the higher the impact of the increase in import prices over the 
domestic prices. 
 3) price behavior after devaluation: price adjustment leads to changes in nominal wages. 
The degree of price adjustment depends on whether the economy is in a recession or on 
whether there is a restrictive fiscal policy, so as to avoid the price-wage spiral.  
The studies on the exchange rate pass-through originate from the investigation of the 
validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. After the devaluation of the US dollar in the 
1970s, US price levels did not increase as much as the exchange rate, seemingly casting some 
  2 doubt on the validity of the PPP theory. Many studies were carried out
3 to test the PPP, but the 
conclusion is that the parity is valid in the long run but not in the short run, that is, the pass-through 
from exchange rates to prices is incomplete. 
Another finding is that the volatility of PPP deviations could have remained stable over time. 
According to ROGOFF(1996), the reasons for such deviations should not be restricted to 
institutional factors that are specific to the 20th
  century. KLEIN (1990) reminds us that the 
difference in the price effects between the US dollar devaluation in 1977-81 and after 1985 and its 
appreciation in 1982-85 offers the following empirical evidence: the pass-through is unstable and 
its change over time is a result of the structure of the economy. EINCHENGREEN (2002) 
highlights that the pass-through is not independent of the monetary regime. If the commitment to 
inflation control is serious and if monetary policy decisions are clear, the agents will reckon the 
validity of a temporary exchange rate shock by the monetary authority as very unlikely, taking 
longer to adjust their prices in response to a change in the exchange rate. Therefore, if the pass-
through is high, the short-term effect of a change in the exchange rate will be stronger on inflation 
than on the product, due to the reluctance to adopt a tighter monetary policy. FRANKEL (1978) 
found evidence of PPP in hyperinflations, which was already expected due to the predominance of 
monetary shocks in such situations. However, the tests rejected the parity for more stable 
monetary environments. All of the studies conducted reached the following conclusions: (i) real 
exchange rates converge to PPP in the very long term at too low a speed of convergence, and (ii) 
short-term deviations from PPP are high and volatile (ROGOFF, 1996). 
Based on these results, the economic theory attempted to explain such deviations. The 
following explanations arose: the role of nontradeables in the economy (ROGOFF, 1996), the 
existence of sticky prices that may influence relative prices (DORNBUSCH, 1976), adjustment 
costs (DIXIT, 1989, KRUGMAN, 1988) and the existence of pricing-to-market (KRUGMAN, 1986). 
For applications of these theories, see KIMBROUGH (1983), FISHER (1989), GOLDBERG and 
KNETTER (1996), VIAENE and VRIES (1992), PARSLEY (1995), ANDERSEN (1997), 
FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997), BORENZSTEIN and de GREGORIO (1999), SMITH (1999), 
BETTS and DEVEREUX (2000), GOLDFJAN and WERLANG (2000), LIEDERMAN and BAR-OR 
(2000), OBSTFELD and ROGOFF (2000), TAYLOR (2000). Among the studies about Brazil, we 
highlight those carried out by FIORENCIO and MOREIRA (1999), BOGDANSKI, TOMBINI and 
WERLANG (2000), MUINHOS (2001), CARNEIRO, MONTEIRO and WU (2002), FIGUEIREDO 
and FERREIRA (2002), BELAISCH (2003), MUINHOS and ALVES (2003) and MINELLA, 
FREITAS, GOLDFAJN and MUINHOS (2003). 
 
                                                 
3 For a good literature review on pass-through and PPP tests, see GOLDBERG and KNETTER, (1996) and 
KLAASSEN (1999), respectively. 
  3 II – The theoretical model 
  
We developed a model of a domestic firm that may choose between selling its production in 
the domestic or in the foreign market, or in both. The price for period t is set in t-1 by maximizing 
the expected profit. Models like this can be found in most pass-through studies that use the pricing-
to-market approach. The difference here is that those models consider that the firm sells only to 
the foreign market and, hence, its decision is concerned with foreign prices. The model developed 
here considers that the firm is a perfect competitor (therefore a price taker) in the foreign market, 
but has some market power domestically. Hence, the firm can choose domestic prices, given its 
domestic and foreign demand, foreign prices, and costs involved. 
Our model is based on FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997), with some pertinent changes : (i) 
as previously mentioned, the decision concerns domestic prices; (ii) we consider the presence of 
imported inputs, implying that costs are a function of the exchange rate; (iii) we include the degree 
of openness in the demand function. The following equations define the model. 
The total revenue of the firm in the domestic market is given by: 
) , , , ( . ope y p p x p RT
imp dom dom dom =  
The total revenue resulting from exports and expressed in domestic currency is: 
*) , , ( . .
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where p and p
exp are the prices charged by the firm in the domestic and foreign market, x
dom 
and x
ext are the domestic and foreign demand, p* is the price of competitors in the foreign market, 
p
imp  is the price of imports competing with the firm’s product domestically, and y and y* are the 
domestic and foreign income, respectively. The nominal exchange rate, expressed in domestic 
currency units per foreign currency, is given by s. The variable ope represents the degree of 
openness, included here for its relevance in explaining inflation, as pointed out by several authors. 
The use of this variable is justified by the studies of TERRA (1998) and ROMER (1993,1998), and 
by the contagion of domestic price indices by the higher presence of import goods. The degree of 
openness is regarded as a proxy for the competition faced by domestic products, being therefore a 
relevant variable in the demand function. 
According to FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997), the firm sells z units of currency in the 
future market at price ft in order to protect itself from the exchange rate risk. Thus, its profit (or loss) 
with the transaction is given by z (ft – st). Exchange rate protection is also a firm’s decision 
variable. 
Hence, the firm’s profit is given by: 
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The firm maximizes the expected utility of profits. Then, the problem of the firm is given by: 
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  4 Using a second-order Taylor’s expansion, we have
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However, it is known that (Πt -(Et-1[Πt])) = 0 and that (Πt - Et-1[Πt])
2 is the conditional 
variance of profits, herein referred to as vart-1(Πt). Such considerations allow us to rewrite (1) as: 
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supposition can be made if we consider that foreign contracts for sales in t are negotiated in t-1. 
So, we have:  
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Supposing Et-1(st) = et and by rearranging the terms above, we obtain: 
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Calculating the conditional variance of profits and naming Et-1 [(st-et)
2], which is the 
conditional variance of the exchange rate, as σ
2
s, we have: 
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Using (2) and (3), (1’) can be rewritten as: 
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Deriving the equation above in relation to zt, a first-order condition is that: 
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From where it follows that: 
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1 1
* ) , , ( ] )) ( ( ' ' / ) ( )) ( ( ' [ t t t t t s t t t t t t t p y p p x E U e f E U z ∗ + ∗ Π − ∗ Π − = − − σ  
However, -U’(Et-1(Πt)) /U’’(Et-1(Πt) is the inverse of the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion 
coefficient (Ru). Hence, 
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The optimal future contract has a term that represents the speculative purchase (or sale) of 
foreign currency, and a second term that corresponds to the contribution of foreign sales to the 
total revenue of the firm
5. 
                                                 
4 It is necessary to disregard the rest in the equation since, otherwise, it would be necessary to incorporate 
the term U’’’(.) – third derivative of the utility function– about which the economic theory has no assumptions. 
  5 Using (2), (3) and (4), equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
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The first-order condition with respect to pt is: 
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From where we get pt, the optimal price to be charged by the firm: 
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where ηt is the price-elasticity of demand (δEt-1(xt
dom(pt,pt
imp,yt,ope))/δpt).  
The next step is to transform the equation above into an equation that can be tested 
empirically. To do that, we need to make a few assumptions concerning the demand and cost 
functions. Let us consider the demand function presented in FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997): 
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This function has the requested properties, that is, it is decreasing in the domestic price and 
increasing in the price of the imported competitor and in the income. Besides, as pointed out by the 
authors, such a function allows the demand for the domestic product to be null. This will happen for 
domestic and imported price levels that are sufficiently high, for the whole market to be supplied. In 
such case, the local product will be demanded if pt <qt(α/β).As previously mentioned, a difference 
in relation to the original study is that here we will consider that variable y will not be regarded as 
income but as the deviation from the potential product instead
6. 
Let us also consider that the domestic price of the imported good in an imperfect market 
depends not only on the actual import price but also on the presence of other foreign competitors 
in the same market. Thus, the higher the degree of openness, the less freedom the importer will 
have to pass elevated mark-ups on to the consumer. Therefore, we consider that some weight is 
placed on competition when setting the prices for the consumer. So p
imp is given by:  
0 , 0 , . ) ( > > =
− ϑ φ
ϑ φ ope p p
M imp  
where p
M is the price imports have when they arrive in Brazil and ope is the degree of 
openness of the economy. The demand function has the following form: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 This result is similar to the one presented by FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997). The difference lies in the 
second term, which, in that work, is the total revenue the firm should obtain with external sales expressed in 
domestic currency. 
6 The product deviation from its natural level, as a proxy for idle capacity, is a relevant variable in pass-
through and inflation studies. The idea is that during a recession (i.e., with high idle capacity), there is more 
difficulty in passing cost increases on to final prices 
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The degree of openness in the function above also presents the required properties. 
Deriving the demand function in relation to the variable ope, we observe a negative sign: the higher 
the degree of openness (and hence, market competition), the smaller the demand for a certain 
product. Likewise, using the function above to derive p in relation to ope, the sign is also negative
7. 
This sign is expected because, according to the literature, there is an inverse relationship between 
inflation and the degree of openness, whose reasons may be found, for instance, in TERRA (1998) 
and ROMER (1993, 1998). According to TERRA (1998), there is a negative relationship between 
inflation and the degree of openness in economies with high level of external indebtedness, since, 
if the major part of the debt belongs to the public sector, taxes will have to be increased. The less 
open an economy is, the higher the exchange rate devaluation required to produce trade 
surpluses, leading to an increase in the liabilities expressed in domestic currency and, hence, a 
greater need to obtain revenues through the inflationary tax. ROMER (1993, 1998) also 
establishes a negative relationship, but the cause lies in the implicit commitment of the monetary 
policy: the more closed an economy is, the greater the benefits of a surprise inflation will be
8. 
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Next, some assumptions should be made about the costs. Since there are imported inputs, 
let us consider that the costs are an increasing function of the exchange rate, assuming the form ct 
= As
θ. Let us also consider that the purchase of inputs to produce goods in t is made in t-1, 
therefore applying the exchange rate in effect at the time. Hence, 
θ
1 − = t t As c  
9
.
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natural logarithm on both sides of the equation: 
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8 However, one must be aware of the difference between the negative relationship between the degree of 
openness and inflation and the positive relationship between the degree of openness and the exchange rate 
pass-through, as recalled by GOLDFAJN and WERLANG(2000). The latter relationship is positive because a 
more open economy means a higher presence of imported goods in the price index. The higher the 
contribution of imported goods, the higher the increase in the price index whenever an exchange rate 
devaluation occurs. 
9 Other assumptions may be made in order to remove the expectation operator from the equation. One of 
them consists in adopting the  assumption of FEENSTRA and KENDAL (1997). If costs follow a time process 
such as lnct = lnct-1 + εt, where εt = εt-1 + vt (vt is a white noise), then Et-1(lnct) is equal to lnct-1 plus a residual 
term. However, the authors do not consider costs as a function of exchange rates, but we can reach the 
same conclusion if we assume such relationship and if we also consider that the exchange rate follows a 
random walk as the one described here. Considering that costs are negotiated in (t-1) to be paid in t with the 
exchange rate in effect at that period would add some algebric complexity to the solution, since we would 
have to consider the term Et-1(st) throughout the exercise. For simplification, we chose the first alternative 
presented here. 
  7 Generalizing, 
 
here γ0 = (½ )ln(Aα/β), α1= (½)θ , α2 = ½  , α3 = ½ϑ , α4=  ½ φ and εt is a white noise error. 
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III – Data 
We used a quarterly sample, from 1980 to 2002, and data were obtained from the websites 
f IPE
 price index _ internal availability (IGP-DI /FGV) ; 
/IBGE); 
vis-à-vis US dollars, 
e)  GDP from its potential level. The first step for its calculation consisted in 
f)  y. It is calculated as the ratio 
g)  e index. A rise in import prices is 
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First, a linear model with constant parameters will be used to test equation 6´´, in order 
hether the parameters changed along the study period, especially parameter α1. If there is 
any evidence of time instability, a specification with time-varying parameters will be tested through 





o A and of the Central Bank of Brazil
10. To deseasonalize the series, we used the X-11 
method. The following variables were used: 
a)  igp_des: Deseasonalized generalized
b)  ipa_des: Deseasonalized wholesale price index (IPA/FGV),  
c)  ipca_des: Deseasonalized broad consumer price index (IPCA
d)  cambio: Nominal exchange rate, selling values, in Brazilian Reais 
monthly average; 
  gap: Deviation of 
deseasonalizing the GDP series provided by IBGE. After that, the trend of the series was 
extracted using the Hoddrick-Prescott filter. The difference between the observed value and 
the trend calculated by the Hoddrick-Prescott filter is the proxy for the GDP deviation from 
its potential level. The expected sign of this variable in the price level is positive: if GDP is 
below its level, a decrease in the product implies a decrease in its gap value, which 
becomes more negative. Thus, we expect an increase in recession to reduce prices. If the 
economy is strong, with GDP above its potential level, an increase in the GDP – which 
causes a rise in prices – increases the positive gap value; 
ope: Represents the degree of openness of the econom
between the sum of exports and imports and the GDP. As previously mentioned, the 
response of prices to this variable has a negative sign; 
p_imp_des: Refers to the deseasonalized import pric
expected to increase prices directly, due to the presence of imported goods in the price 
index, and indirectly, due to its presence in production costs. 
 
10 http://www.ipeadata.gov.br and http://www.bcb.gov.br , respectively. 
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IV– Empirical analysis 
.1 – Stationarity and cointegration 









 Tables 1 and 2 show the results of stationarity tests in level and in first difference, 
respectively. The optimal number of lags for AD&F tests was based on Akaike information criteria. 
Note that the variable gap is stationary, while the variables openess, ipca_des, ipa_des and
imp_des have unit roots, both on the Augmented Dick & Fuller test (AD&F) and on the 
Phillip-Perron test (PP). For the variable cambio, the ADF test described the series as stationary, 
whereas the PP test indicated the presence of unit roots
11. For the IGP-DI, the ADF test shows the 
series as nonstationary – at a 5% significance level – both in level and in first difference. The PP 
test presented the series as being I(1). In Table 2, the variables ope, e, p, pm, igp, ipa express the 


























  -2.1726(8)  1.4139
b
* Null hypothesis of the presence of unit roo
ithout a trend term; 
bTest made w gures between parentheses indicate the optimal 
                                                
t rejected at 5% 
ithout trend and intercept terms; fi
a Test made w
number of lags for the test. 
 
11 The Dickey-Fuller GLS and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schimidt-Shin tests also identified “câmbio” as I(1). 
  9 TABLE 2 – ADF stationarity test for variables in first difference  
Variable  ADF test statistics  Phillip-Perron test statistics 
ope -3.1675**(7)  -38.2634* 
e -2.4634(2)
a -3.9883* 
p -3.5620(0)*  -3.3988* 







*, ** Null hypothesis of the presence of unit roots rejected at 5% and at 10%, respectively 
a Test made without a trend term; 
bTest made without trend and intercept terms; figures between parentheses indicate the optimal 
number of lags for the test. 
 
TABLE 3 – Cointegration test - IPCA  
Series: IPCA_DES OPENNESS CAMBIO PRECO_IMP_DES  
Lags: (in first differences): 1 to 2 
Trend assumption: deterministic linear trend 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Trace test  5% critical value  1% critical value 
None   0.224714   32.09613   47.21   54.46 
At most 1   0.072061   9.443602   29.68   35.65 
At most 2   0.029431   2.787392   15.41   20.04 
At most 3   0.001445   0.128677    3.76    6.65 
*(**) rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%(1%); the trace test indicates no cointegration equation at 5% and at 1% 
 
TABLE 4 – Cointegration test  - IGP-DI 
Séries: IGP_DES OPENNESS CAMBIO PRECO_IMP_DES  
Lags: (in first differences): 1 to 2 
Trend assumption: deterministic linear trend 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Trace test  5% critical value  1% critical value 
None   0.248336   37.23425   47.21   54.46 
At most 1   0.077971   11.82773   29.68   35.65 
At most 2   0.049677   4.602857   15.41   20.04 
At most 3   0.000764   0.067981    3.76    6.65 
*(**) rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%(1%); the trace test indicates no cointegration equation at 5% and at 1% 
 
TABLE 5 – Cointegration test – IPA-DI 
Series: IPA_DES OPENNESS CAMBIO PRECO_IMP_DES  
Lags: (in first differences): 1 to 2 
Trend assumption: deterministic linear trend 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Trace test  5% critical value  1% critical value
None   0.270498   41.30977   47.21   54.46 
At most 1   0.082633   13.23980   29.68   35.65 
At most 2   0.058054   5.563713   15.41   20.04 
At most 3   0.002702   0.240829    3.76    6.65 
*(**) rejection of the null hypothesis at 5%(1%); the trace test indicates no cointegration equation at 5% and at 1% 
 
  10  With regard to cointegration tests, Tables 3 to 5 show that cointegration vectors are not 
present in any of the three cases considered (IPCA, IGP-DI, IPA). Therefore, we have to use the 
first difference of the variables. 
 
IV.2 – LINEAR MODELS 
 
First we tested the model using OLS. For all price indices, as shown in Appendix I, the 
models showed specification errors (Reset test), parameter and/or variance instability (CUSUM of 
squares tests), autocorrelation of residuals (for IGP and IPA) and Arch residuals (for IPA).  Given 
these results and the previous knowledge about changes in the inflation pattern and exchange rate 
policy after 1994, we made two attempts to model these changes: to split the sample into two 
periods and to include dummy variables in the exchange rate coefficient. 
The two subsamples refer to the pre- and post-Real periods, and are used to check 
whether there are significant changes in the parameters in these periods. The first subsample, 
covering the pre-Real plan, goes up to 1993, while the second one starts in 1995. The year 1994 
was not included in any of the samples because we consider it as a transition period, where agents 
could predict the changes in the monetary policy. Inflation indices were still influenced by the high 
inflationary levels of the previous period. Hence, the pattern observed in 1994 may be neither 
characteristic of the pre-Real period nor of the post-Real one.  
The inclusion of dummy variables to indicate the three major periods of Brazilian monetary 
policy concerning inflation and exchange rate aims at verifying whether such inclusion is enough to 
model the breaks suggested in the previous analysis. The model will therefore have the following 
form: 
P = µ + (α1+α14d4 + α15d5)*et-1 + α2*gapt-1 + α3*opet-1 + α4*PMt-1 + εt    (7) 
Dummy variables d4 and d5 represent the post-Real period with pegged and floating 
exchange rates, respectively, with unity values assigned to the periods t they intend to represent. 
Thus, the exchange rate coefficient for the pre-Real period is α1, while for the 1994:III to 1998:IV 
period it is α1+α4 ,and α1 + α5 between 1999:I and 2002:IV. 
Splitting the period into two subsamples is not enough to eliminate specification errors, 
parameter instability, and presence of autocorrelation (see Appendix I). The inclusion of dummy 
variables allowed correcting such problems and perceiving the change in the exchange rate 
coefficient after the Real Plan. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that α1 + α15 equals 
zero, which means that the pass-through from exchange rate to inflation after 1999 is null – a 
contradiction from the economic standpoint.  
Parameter instability, significant differences between the variables for the post-Real 
sample, specification errors in the model pointed out by Reset tests may be an indicative sign that 
analyzing the period using models with time-invariant parameters is not the most adequate 
  11  approach, especially when we consider the exchange rate pass-through, whose behavior changed 
after 1995. 
The inclusion of dummy variables in the exchange rate coefficient – as in equation 7 – 
avoids some of the problems detected by the tests, especially residual autocorrelation and 
parameter and/or variance instability. However, if on the one hand the tests revealed some 
instability in the exchange rate coefficient, on the other hand, they yielded results which do not 
seem coherent since the pass-through from exchange rate to inflation is statistically null for the 
three indices. The correction of the instability and autocorrelation by means of dummy variables 
shows that the exchange rate coefficient should not be regarded as time-invariant. The incapability 
of such dummy variables to identify the changes that occurred after the floating exchange rate 
regime led us to test the initial model using the Kalman Filter. 
 
IV.3 –The Kalman Filter Analysis 
 
The Kalman Filter was applied in a general-to-specific process. First, we tested a model 
where all coefficients were stochastic. Afterwards, we restricted the number of stochastic 
coefficients based upon the statistical significance of the variance coefficient in the state equation 
and upon the information criteria. Thus, the variables whose state variance coefficient (parameters 
ϑµ,t and ϑαit   in equations 8 ) were not significant were considered as having time-invariant 
parameters. The advantage of such procedure is that if we consider that only the exchange rate 
coefficient is stochastic and that other coefficients vary over time, the results found for the 
exchange rate will incorporate the movements in those coefficients regarded as time-invariant. 
Another decision refers to the space equation format, i.e., whether it is a random walk or an 
AR(1) process. In the first case, the effects of the stochastic coefficients are assumed to be 
permanent, whereas in the second case, the effects, although persistent, are regarded as 
temporary. Since exchange rate shocks are not permanent – once they are passed on to prices, in 
different degrees,– we adopted the AR(1) format for the space equation. If the estimated AR 
parameter is close to unity, a random walk formulation will be tested. 
We tested the inclusion of dummy variables in the state equation of the exchange rate 
parameter in order to verify whether the exchange rate regime or the price dynamics affects that 
equation. Thus, three dummy variables were tested. The first of them – d1 – assumed a value 
equal to zero for periods when there was a managed exchange rate system in Brazil, and equal to 
one for the other periods with officially floating exchange rates (March 1990 to February 1995 and 
January 1999 to December 2002). The second dummy variable – d2 – differs from d1 as it assumes 
a value equal to the unit in those periods with effectively and not only officially floating exchange 
rates. Therefore, d2 refers to the period known as managed exchange rate system. “Managed” 
means that the monetary authorities interfere in the exchange rate market, but have no intention to 
maintain the exchange rate stable at a given level regarded as ideal by the government, as 
occurred between March 1990 and July 1994 (see ARAUJO and FILHO (2002)). Thus, d2 assumes 
  12  a unit value from July to September 1994 and from January 1999 on, and a zero value for the other 
periods. The purpose of such distinction is to verify whether the announced exchange rate regime 
is relevant to price setting or how exchange rates behave in practice. Finally, the third dummy 
variable – d3 – aims at comparing the price dynamics in high-inflation periods with stable periods. 
Therefore, d3 has a unit value for the pre-Real period, and a zero value for the post-Real period. 
 
Chart 1 – Tested Dummies
Dummy  Plan  Period with a unit value 
D1 Officially floating exchange rates  1990:I – 1995:I; 1999:I – 2002:IV 
D2 Managed exchange rate system  1994:III ; 1999:I – 2002:IV 
D3 High inflation  1980:I – 1994:II 
D4 Real Plan with pegged exchange rates  1994:III – 1998:IV 
D5 Real Plan with floating exchange rates  1999:I – 2002:IV 
Dcruz Cruzado plan  1986:I – 1986:III 
Dbress Bresser plan  1988:III 
Dver Summer plan  1989:I 
Dcol1 Collor 1 plan  1990:I – 1990: II 
Dcol2 Collor 2 plan  1991:I – 1991:II 
Dreal Real plan  1994:III – 2002:IV 
 
We also tested dummy variables related to the economic plans announced in the course of 
the study period, according to CATI, GARCIA and PERRON (1999). The variables have a unit 
value throughout the period in which economic plans were in effect, and a zero value for the other 
periods, except for the post-Real period, which was not included in the referred paper. Two 
dummies were assigned to the post-Real period: d4, with a unit value between July 1994 and 
December 1998, and d5 with a unit value after the exchange rate devaluation in 1999. The dummy 
variables are shown in Chart 1. 
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12 In order to ensure a positive variance term, εt and ϑα1,t were defined as var[exp(εt)] and var[exp(ϑα1,t)], 
respectively.  The choice for naming the variables through the text just as εt and ϑα1,t was adopted for 
simplification . 
  13  The final model, however, changed according to the inflation index used, as shown in the 
following sections. 
IV.3.1 – IPCA 
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In Table 6 - which shows the results obtained – we note that the coefficient of gap (α2,t) is 
significant and has the expected sign. The coefficient of the degree of openness (α3,t), although it 
contains the expected sign, is not significant. The coefficient α4,t, which refers to import prices, 
does not contain the expected positive sign, and is not significant. 
 
Table 6  –Kalman Filter : IPCA Results
Variable coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistics  p-value 
Measure Equation 
α2 1.636715 0.731031 2.238912 0.0252
α3 -0.044387 0.089447 -0.496233 0.6197
α4,t -0.001186 0.000802 -1.478920 0.1392
State Equation  - Intercept 
c1 0.007883 0.013579 0.580584 0.5615
c2 0.948579 0.049568 19.13699 0.0000
ϑµ,t -5.954234 0.392567 -15.16744 0.0000
State Equation – Pass-through coefficient 
a11 0.489162 0.148228 3.300074 0.0010
a12 0.005248 0.188764 0.027799 0.9778
a1,3 -0.488220 0.242746 -2.011240 0.0443
ϑα1,t -2.208140 0.262412 -8.414797 0.0000
  Final State  Root MSE  z-statistics  p-value 
µT+1|T 0.046336 0.065347 0.709071 0.4783
α1,T+1|T 0.001166 0.331521 0.003517 0.9972
Log-likelihood  66.15722 Akaike Information Criteria  -1.225716
Hannan-Quinn Criteria  -1.102508 Schwartz Information Criteria  -0.920184
 
As far as variances are concerned, we note that the variances of the state equation for the 
intercept and the exchange rates (ϑµ,t ϑα1,t) have significant coefficients, which means that they are 
                                                 
13 Appendix I shows some other models tested for IPCA, IGP-DI and IPA using the Kalman Filter. 
  14  effective. In other words, the coefficients are actually varying over time and, hence, the Kalman 
Filter captures changes in these coefficients that a model with constant parameters would not. 
As for the intercept, we observe that c1 is not significant whereas c2 is. This means that, 
although the mean of the intercept is null, shocks are persistent on it. Such a result is expected in 
an inflation model if we consider that this variable captures the inflationary inertia of the period, 
since the Kalman filter with varying parameters on the constant is equivalent to estimating the 
stochastic trend of the series. So, we can consider that the constant, to some extent, represents 
the inflationary inertia. Graph 1 shows that this coefficient becomes not only smaller but also more 
stable after the implementation of the Real Plan, underscoring the idea of a remarkably low 
inflationary inertia after price stabilization. 
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Concerning the behavior of the exchange rate coefficient, α1,t, a11 is significant, while a12 is 
not. In the former case, the exchange rate pass-through is important in explaining prices, 
regardless of the period. However, shocks on this coefficient do not propagate through time. In 
other words, the stochastic process resembles a white noise. The forecast for period t+1 is given 
by  2 13 1 , 1 12 11 1 , 1 ) ( d a a a E t t + + = − + α α . Since a12 and a13 are indifferent from zero, the best forecast of 
the value for the exchange rate pass-through (α1,t+1) is the mean of the process, a11. Hence, an 
increase of 1% in the exchange rate causes an average increase, in the period analyzed, of 0.49% 
in the inflation rate. Finally, the dummy variable d2, is significant, implying that the intervention in 
the exchange rate market affects the pass-through dynamics.  
By analyzing Graph 2, which shows the smoothed estimates of the pass-through 
coefficient, we can clearly identify three different periods in the behavior of α1. These periods may 
be associated with three different moments of the Brazilian economy throughout the sample 
period. 
The first period goes from 1980 until the implementation of the Real plan.  A considerably 
high and volatile exchange rate pass–through characterizes this period, with peaks close to one, 
which illustrates the exchange rate/price spiral typical of high inflations. The mean pass-through for 
the period is 0.49 (see Appendix II), but there are moments of sharp reductions that may be 
associated with the different economic plans (1986:II, 1987:III, 1988:IV, 1990:II, 1991:II, 1992:I). 
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The second period covers 1995 to 1998, where the mean drops to 0.42 (Appendix II), and 
so does its volatility, showing a more stable behavior over time. Finally, the third period starts in 
1999, when the floating exchange rates were adopted and the coefficient remarkably decreased, 
yielding a mean value of around 0.4. 
At first, the strong decrease in 1999 is not expected since, in large devaluations, a higher 
pass-through from exchange rates to prices is assumed. However, the Brazilian economic scenario 
at the time, with recession and extremely volatile exchange rates, may have favored a contrary 
behavior. In this scenario, price setters would not be able to increase their prices proportionately to 
the devaluation as they used to do before, due to the economic slowdown, which inhibits demand, 
and to the uncertainty about the future. If the exchange rates do not mantain that higher level, the 
costs to reverse the price increase (menu costs and reputation costs, for instance) could be much 
higher
14.  Furthermore, in times of pegged exchange rates, changes in exchange rates are 
considered to be permanent and, therefore, agents have an extra incentive to adjust their prices as 
soon as possible. However, in times of floating exchange rates, the resulting uncertainty and the 
presence of factors such as menu costs and hysteresis (see DIXIT, 1986), make agents “wait and 
see” until they can be sure that the (de)valuation is permanent and until they know the new 
exchange rate level. 
 
IV.3.2 – IGP-DI 
 
The IGP-DI model is quite similar to that used for IPCA, with time-varying coefficients for 
the exchange rate and intercept. Although d2 was not significant, its inclusion yielded better results 
than the inclusions of other dummy variables (also nonsignificant) or than its absence. The three 
periods related to the behavior of the exchange rate coefficient are more noticeable than in the 
case of IPCA, and the decrease in 1999 is less intense as well, (Table 7 and graphs 3 and 4). 
                                                 
14 For a detailed discussion, see DIXIT (1986). 
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Table 7 Kalman Filter : IGP-DI Results
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistics  p-value 
Measurement Equation 
α2 1.9712 1.0770 1.8303 0.0672 
α3 0.0389 0.1638 0.2377 0.8121 
α4 0.0003 0.0015 0.1715 0.8638 
State Equation  - Intercept 
c1 -5.1799 0.3117  -16.6200  0.0000 
c2 0.0113 0.0200 0.5671 0.5707 
ϑµ,t 0.9457 0.0414  22.8407  0.0000 
State Equation  - Pass-through Coefficient 
a11 0.3246 0.1807  1.79645  0.0724 
a12 -0.0075 0.1871 -0.0401 0.9680 
a1,3 -0.2702 0.2547 -1.0611 0.2887 
ϑα1,t -2.0026 0.3888 -5.1514 0.0000 
  Final State  Root MSE  z-statistics  p-value 
µT+1|T 0.0690 0.0918  0.75120  0.4525 
α1,T+1|T 0.0536 0.3674 0.1458 0.8841 
Log-likelihood  44.0753 Akaike Information Criteria  -0.7350 
Hannan-Quinn Criteria  -0.6118  Schwartz Information Criteria  -0.4295 
 
As for the significance of fixed parameters and their signs, import prices are still indifferent 
from zero. α2 and α3 are significant, although the former one does not present the expected sign. 
With regard to the exchange rate coefficient, again, it has a white noise with drift. We may 
also note that most of the sharp reductions in the coefficients are the same ones found for IPCA 
(1986:II, 1987:III, 1989:I, 1989:IV, 1990:II to 1990:4, 1991:I, 1991:II, 1992:I, 1994:I). The coefficient 
– or the exchange-rate elasticity of prices - is 0.3246 for the whole period. Calculating the mean of 
the filtered estimates of α1,t for the three periods, we have an elasticity of 0.33  for 1980:I to 1994:II 
– if we remove the above mentioned periods from the sample, this value goes to 0.40 – 0.27 from 
1994:III to 1998:IV and 0.07 from 1999:I on (see Appendix II). Thus, the Real plan led to a 
decrease in the pass-through, but the change in the exchange rate system and the adoption of the 
inflation targeting regime in 1999 caused a sharper decrease in this coefficient. 
 








82  84  86  88 90 92 94 96 98 00  02 
µt  ± 2 R M S E
 
 









1985  1990 1995 2000 
α1,t  ± 2 R M S E
 
 













































































































































































































  Graph 5 draws some attention to the comparison of both indexes through the filtered 
estimates of the exchange rate coefficients in both cases (IPCA and IGP-DI) after the Real plan. 
Until 1999, the exchange rate pass-through to IPCA was, on average, higher than to the IGP-DI, 
which justifies the selection of the latter one as the index used to realign contracts. After 1999, we 
  18  have an opposite situation, when the IGP-DI – which consists mostly of wholesale prices - had a 




The best model that the Kalman filter identified for the wholesale price index (IPA) had only 
the exchange-rate coefficient as time-varying. The model assumes the following form: 
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In case of IPA, the most satisfactory results were those where only the exchange rate 
coefficient varies over time. Again, α1,t follows a white noise with drift, as shown in Table 8. This 
means that the best forecast for the pass-through from exchange rates to IPA is the mean of the 
process. We can also note, according to Graph 6, that the only change in the behavior of the 
coefficient is the peaks in the early 1990s and a smaller volatility after the Real plan. However, the 
mean of the coefficient was relatively stable: 0.90 from 1980:I to 1994:II, 0.86 from 1994:3 to 98:4 
and 0.87 from 1999:I on (see Appendix II). If we exclude the moments in which  there was a sharp 
decrease in the filtered coefficient (basically the same as with IPCA and IGP-DI: 1986:II, 1987:III, 
1989:II, 1990:II, 1991:I, 1991:II, 1992:I, 1994:III, 1994:IV, 1999:II) – the mean goes to 0.93 
between 1980:I and 1994:II, 0.89 for 1994:II/1998:IV and 0.88 after 1999. 
The values presented here are quite high compared to the ones found for the other two 
indices. As they are close to the unit, they also suggest a virtually complete pass-through from 
exchange rate to wholesale prices. This result seems to demonstrate what the economic theory 
had already predicted: wholesale prices are more strongly affected by exchange rate movements 
and, in the absence of nontradeables, the pass-through from exchange rate to inflation is almost 
complete. An explanation to this behavior can be found in the theoretical model developed in this 
paper. Since Brazil is a small economy, it is a price-taker in the foreign market and it is not able to 
affect international prices as predicted by the pricing-to-market models applied to developed 
economies15. A smaller pass-through to consumer prices (IPCA and IGP) reflects the absorption 
of the exchange rate by retailers, which can be explained – given the maximization model 
presented in this paper – by an attempt to avoid a reduction in demand that is not offset by a rise in 
prices. This does not necessarily mean losses for the agents, but only a change in their profit 
margins. 
 
                                                 
15 Those models consider that, in face of an exchange rate devaluation in country B, the exporting firm in 
country A will reduce its exporting prices for B in order not to have a high reduction in sales in that country, 
given the weight of that market on its global demand. The result of such an action is that prices in B will rise 
less than proportionally to the exchange rate devaluation, resulting in an incomplete pass-through and 
evidence of the rejection of PPP. 
  19  Table 8- Kalman Filter : IPA Results
Variable Coefficient  Standard  error  t-statistics  p-value 
Measure equation 
µt 0.0471 0.0491 0.9590 0.3376 
α2 1.9392 1.031 1.8809 0.0600 
α3 -0.0937 0.2224 -0.4212 0.6736 
α4 0.0019 0.0048 0.4032 0.6868 
State Equation  - Pass-through Coefficient 
a11 1.0908 0.3694 2.9526 0.0032 
a12 -0.2263 0.3667 -0.6171 0.5372 
ϑα1,t -2.7168 0.9236 -2.9417 0.0033 
  Final State  Root MSE  z-statistics  p-value 
α1, T+1|T 0.9029 0.2631 3.4323 0.0006 
Log-likelihood  26.7479  Akaike Information Criteria  -0.4166 
Hannan-Quinn Criteria  -0.3270  Schwartz Information Criteria  -0.1944 
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V – Comparison of Results 
 
According to the results obtained herein, there is a decrease in the pass-through from the 
exchange rate to IPCA and IGP-DI after the stabilization of the Real, and a sharper one after the 
shift in the exchange rate regime in 1999. Before 1999, the effects of an exchange rate shock in 
period t on IGP-DI would be complete after approximately four quarters (considering the absence 
of further shocks). After 1999, only 32% of the shock would have been absorbed by the index in an 
equal period. For IPCA, between 1980 and 1998, the pass-through of the shock would be complete 
in two quarters before 1999, but after that year it would represent only 7%. The exception is IPA-
DI, which keeps an almost complete pass-through in the third quarter. 
  20  The exchange rate pass-through behavior found in the present paper is in line with other 
estimates reported in the literature. MINELLA, FREITAS, GOLDFAJN and MUINHOS (2003) 
analyzed the post-Real period and also found a change in the exchange rate pass-through to 
prices after 1999 (considering the 12-month exchange rate variation with one lag). However, the 
magnitude of the change is different, depending on the approach adopted: the Central Bank’s 
structural model, the Phillips curve, or a VAR model. Nonetheless, the graph of the recursive 
estimation of the coefficients found in the Phillips curve for IPCA is very similar to Graph 2 
presented in section IV.3.1 of this paper. 
The results for IPCA in the post-Real period are also similar to the ones presented by 
MUINHOS and ALVES (2003) for free prices – which correspond to approximately 70% of IPCA – 
by applying a non-linear Phillips curve. The authors found an exchange rate pass-through of 0.51 
between 1995:I and 1998:IV and of 0.06 from 1999:I on. The values observed for the period after 
1999 are also similar to the ones presented by CARNEIRO, MONTEIRO and WU (2002), who 
found a quarterly exchange rate pass-through between 1999 and 2002 of 6.4% on average. 
Our results for IPCA are also close to the ones presented by BELAISCH (2003), who 
observed a 6% exchange rate pass-through in Brazil in a 3-month period through a VAR model. 
However, the results are considerably different for the other indices (27% for the IGP and 34% for 
the IPA). Despite this difference, the relation between the magnitudes of the coefficients is the 
same: the pass-through to IPA is larger than to IGP, which is larger than to IPCA. 
GODLJAN and WERLANG (2000) found a six-month accumulated pass-through of about 
21% for European economies and 38% for emerging ones between 1980 and 1998. HAUSSMAN, 
PANIZZA and STEIN (1999) also encountered different pass-through values among the analyzed 
countries. For instance, the USA, the UK and Japan have an average 12-month accumulated 
pass-through of 3%; Germany, Canada and Norway, 7%; Switzerland, Greece, Israel and Korea, 
16%; Australia and Peru, 21%, and Mexico, Paraguay and Poland, over 50%, among others. 
MUINHOS (2001) uses a sample with quarterly data from 1980 to 2000, different 
estimations of the Phillips curve, with and without an expectation term and with linear and non-
linear specifications (the latter of which contains cross-terms), also including a short sample 
relating to the period after 1995. The results of the linear specification point towards a pass-
through coefficient of 0.10 in the small sample if the expectation term is not included and of 0.09 if 
this term is included. In the non-linear specification, the pass-through coefficients are 0.24 without 
the expectation term, 0.12 with the term, and 0.55 for the whole sample. However, the results do 
not indicate changes in the exchange rate pass-through after 1995 in the whole sample, or in both 
samples, after 1999. When the authors show the behavior of pass-through coefficients after 1998 
for the small sample, there is a break in this coefficient after the floating exchange rate regime was 
adopted. The average coefficient for 1998 is, in this case, higher than 0.5 while it is of about 0.1 
after 1999, a result that is in line with the ones presented in this paper. Nevertheless, such change 
  21  is not identified in the whole sample (1980 to 2000) when the coefficient for 1998 is also around 
0.1.  
 
VI – Final Remarks 
 
Some conclusions may be drawn in light of what was discussed in this paper. The first 
conclusion is that the model developed from a pricing-to-market approach is able to indicate 
changes that occurred in the exchange rate coefficient throughout the study period. Furthermore, 
amongst the tested formulations, non-linear models and time-variant coefficients are more suitable 
than OLS coefficients with time-invariant parameters, even when the sample is divided. The results 
obtained by MUINHOS (2001) who, as other previously mentioned authors, observed a decrease 
in the exchange rate pass-through after 1999 only when using the small sample, lends further 
support to the Kalman Filter to the detriment of time-invariant models, when such a long and 
complex period is analyzed. 
In comparison with the results found by GOLDFJAN and WERLANG (2000) and by 
HAUSSMAN, PANIZZA and STEIN (1999), the data presented herein show that the pass-through 
from the exchange rate to prices in Brazil is not only smaller after the adoption of the floating 
exchange rate system in 1999, but also quite similar to the ones observed in stronger economies. 
Our paper shows that the macroeconomic environment affects the way prices will respond to 
exchange rate movements, as it is possible to identify three different patterns in the pass-through 
coefficient: the first one is characterized by a high inflation period, the second one concerns the 
period of low inflation and pegged exchange rates, and the third one refers to the period of stable 
prices and floating exchange rates. The presence of the dummy variable d2 also suggests that the 
type of exchange rate regime observed by the agents – more than the one officially announced – 
also affects the response of prices to exchange rate movements. 
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  25  APPENDIX I – LINEAR MODEL RESULTS 
 
A.I – Linear Models – Complete Sample (TABLES) 
Table A.1 -  IPCA  
Coefficient Estimate  Standard  Error  t-statistics  p-value 
µ  0.0508 0.0286 1.7784 0.0789 
α1 0.8398 0.0684  12.2763  0.0000 
α2 2.1079 0.7436 2.8349 0.0057 
α3 -0.3304 0.1884 -1.7534 0.0831 
α4 -0.0007 0.0037 -0.1965 0.8447 
R
2 0.6433  Mean dependent var  0.2891 
R
2 adjusted  0.6265  S.D. dependent var  0.3205 
S.E. of regression 3.2603  AIC  -0.3690 
LM test (1
st order)  0.0065†  SIC  -0.2301 
ARCH-LM test (1
st order)  17.6433*  F-statistic  38.3271 
Ramsey-Reset test (2
nd order)  2.9960*  Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 
* significant at 5%;† for higher orders the presence of residual autocorrelation was also rejected 
Table A.2 – IGP-DI 
Coefficient Estimate  Standard  Error  t-statistics  p-value 
µ  0.0644 0.0290 2.2220 0.0289 
α1 0.8083 0.0695  11.6346  0.0000 
α2 1.9492 0.7552 2.5812 0.0116 
α3 -0.1666 0.1914 -0.8703 0.3866 
α4 0.0008 0.0038 0.1975 0.8439 
R
2 0.6152  Mean dependent var  0.2955 
R
2 adjusted  0.5971  S.D. dependent var  0.3134 
S.E. of regression 0.1989  AIC  -0.3380 
LM test (1
st order)  2.5224**  SIC  -0.1991 
ARCH-LM test (1
st order)  0.5579†  F-statistic  33.9716 
Ramsey-Reset test (1
st order)  3.4552*  Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 10%;† for higher orders the presence of residual autocorrelation was also rejected 
Table A.3 – IPA 
Coefficient Estimate  Standard  Error  t-statistics  p-value 
µ  0.0636 0.0292 2.1778 0.0322 
α1 0.8119 0.0699  11.6112  0.0000 
α2 1.9018 0.7600 2.5024 0.0143 
α3 -0.1830 0.1926 -0.9504 0.3446 
α4 0.0008 0.0038 0.2105 0.8338 
R
2 0.6145  Mean dependent var  0.2955 
R
2 adjusted  0.5964  S.D. dependent var  0.3151 
S.E. of regression 0.2002  AIC  -0.3252 
LM test (2
st order)  3.2633*  SIC  -0.1863 
ARCH-LM test (2
nd order)  5.6300*  F-statistic  33.8757 
Ramsey-Reset test (1
st order)  3.5620*  Prob(F-statistic)  0.0000 







  26  A.II – Alternative Linear Models (TABLES) 
Table A.4 – IPCA  
Coefficient  Pre-Real  Post-Real  Model with dummy 
variables 












α14 - -  -0.5680* 
(0.1669) 





















2 0.4888 0.2304  0.7006 
R
2 adjusted  0.4471 0.1164  0.6789 
S.E. of regression 2.3945  0.0147  0.1816 
LM test (1
st order)  0.0879† 13.5814*  0.7835† 
ARCH-LM test (1
st order)  7.8165* 6.5385*  23.0965* 
Ramsey-Reset test (1
st order)  2.9151***
(a) 0.2304
**  
        *significant  at  1%;  **significant at 5%; ***significant at 10%; (a) test in second order; † for higher orders, residual 
autocorrelation was also rejected  
Table A.5 – IGP-DI  
Coefficient  Pre-Real  Post-Real  Model with dummy 
variables 












α14 - -  -0.4192* 
(0.1748) 





















2 0.4210 0.2655  0.6564 
R
2 adjusted  0.3737 0.1567  0.6316 
S.E. of regression 0.2252  0.0189  0.1902 
LM test (1
st order)  4.2357
(a) **  0.3868†  1.3723
 ** 
ARCH-LM test (1
st order)  0.0830† 0.6568†  1.4793** 
Ramsey-Reset test (1
st order)  2.3705
(a)*** 3.6850**
(a) 0.6564 
        *significant  at  1%;  **significant at 5%; ***significant at 10%; (a) test in second order; † for higher orders, residual 






  27Table A.6– IPA-DI  
Coefficient  Pre-Real  Post-Real  Model with dummy 
variables 












α14 - -  -0.4344* 
(0.1764) 





















2 0.4256 0.324  0.6541 
R
2 adjusted  0.3787 0.2239  0.6291 
S.E. of regression 0.2293  0.0256  0.1919 
LM test (1








st order)  2.8311*** 6.4948**
(a)  
        *significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 10%; (a) test in second order; † for higher orders, residual autocorrelation 
was also rejected 
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  34APPENDIX II – FILTERED COEFFICIENTS– VALUES AND MEANS 
 
II.1 – Filtered Coefficients of  α1,t – IPCA 
 
DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate 
1980-1  0.0000  1987-4  0.3051  1995-3  0.5409 
1980-2  0.4582  1988-1  0.7671  1995-4  0.4747 
1980-3  0.4620  1988-2  0.4572  1996-1  0.4550 
1980-4  0.5130  1988-3  1.4162  1996-2  0.4481 
1981-1  0.3686  1988-4  -0.4444  1996-3  0.4612 
1981-2  0.4391  1989-1  0.6641  1996-4  0.4225 
1981-3  0.5050  1989-2  0.7343  1997-1  0.4624 
1981-4  0.5096  1989-3  0.8732  1997-2  0.4543 
1982-1  0.6443  1989-4  0.6297  1997-3  0.4541 
1982-2  0.4166  1990-1  1.0293  1997-4  0.4454 
1982-3  0.3926  1990-2  0.1772  1998-1  0.4643 
1982-4  0.3397  1990-3  0.1075  1998-2  0.4717 
1983-1  0.6340  1990-4  0.2846  1998-3  0.4367 
1983-2  0.4925  1991-1  0.4021  1998-4  0.4646 
1983-3  0.5250  1991-2  0.1042  1999-1  0.0819 
1983-4  0.5661  1991-3  0.4583  1999-2  0.0197 
1984-1  0.5688  1991-4  0.4620  1999-3  0.0378 
1984-2  0.5024  1992-1  0.1729  1999-4  0.0218 
1984-3  0.5192  1992-2  0.3231  2000-1  0.0034 
1984-4  0.5487  1992-3  0.3244  2000-2  0.1217 
1985-1  0.4631  1992-4  0.5412  2000-3  0.0393 
1985-2  0.2699  1993-1  0.5287  2000-4  0.0208 
1985-3  0.4645  1993-2  0.4926  2001-1  -0.0557 
1985-4  0.5364  1993-3  0.5694  2001-2  0.0342 
1986-1  0.4541  1993-4  0.6168  2001-3  0.0422 
1986-2  -0.1555  1994-1  0.6633  2001-4  0.0649 
1986-3  0.3079  1994-2  0.6673  2002-1  0.0301 
1986-4  0.4595  1994-3  0.0581  2002-2  -0.0423 
1987-1  0.6253  1994-4  -0.2927  2002-3  -0.0421 
1987-2  0.7878  1995-1  0.5671  2002-4  0.0570 
1987-3  0.0552  1995-2  0.4270    
Period Mean 
1980:1 / 1994:2    0.4876 
1994:3 / 1998:4   0.4213 
1999:1 / 2002:4   0.0346 
 
  35II.2 – Filtered Coefficients of α1,t – IGP 
 
DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate 
1980-1  0.0000  1987-4  0.2429  1995-3  0.3683 
1980-2  0.3245  1988-1  0.5097  1995-4  0.3553 
1980-3  0.3221  1988-2  0.4317  1996-1  0.2972 
1980-4  0.3336  1988-3  0.6012  1996-2  0.3174 
1981-1  0.2432  1988-4  0.5513  1996-3  0.3206 
1981-2  0.2933  1989-1  0.3359  1996-4  0.3108 
1981-3  0.3307  1989-2  0.0694  1997-1  0.3082 
1981-4  0.4270  1989-3  1.3132  1997-2  0.3228 
1982-1  0.4174  1989-4  -0.4109  1997-3  0.3058 
1982-2  0.3100  1990-1  0.5020  1997-4  0.3279 
1982-3  0.2353  1990-2  -0.0620  1998-1  0.3114 
1982-4  0.2520  1990-3  -0.1438  1998-2  0.3298 
1983-1  0.4193  1990-4  -0.1819  1998-3  0.3057 
1983-2  0.5477  1991-1  0.0956  1998-4  0.3273 
1983-3  0.4818  1991-2  0.1157  1999-1  0.3591 
1983-4  0.5161  1991-3  0.3245  1999-2  -0.0370 
1984-1  0.2967  1991-4  0.3221  1999-3  0.0658 
1984-2  0.3107  1992-1  0.0712  1999-4  0.0754 
1984-3  0.3191  1992-2  0.2772  2000-1  0.0256 
1984-4  0.4376  1992-3  0.3870  2000-2  0.0929 
1985-1  0.2023  1992-4  0.4595  2000-3  0.0525 
1985-2  0.2105  1993-1  0.3525  2000-4  0.0456 
1985-3  0.3234  1993-2  0.4620  2001-1  0.0115 
1985-4  0.3559  1993-3  0.5155  2001-2  0.0584 
1986-1  0.2405  1993-4  0.5212  2001-3  0.0347 
1986-2  -0.1499  1994-1  0.5229  2001-4  0.0732 
1986-3  0.2249  1994-2  0.5412  2002-1  0.0538 
1986-4  0.3225  1994-3  0.0797  2002-2  0.0758 
1987-1  0.4050  1994-4  -0.5037  2002-3  0.0447 
1987-2  0.8969  1995-1  0.4877  2002-4  0.0996 
1987-3  0.1352  1995-2  0.3094    
Period Mean 
1980:1 / 1994:2    0.3283 
1994:3 / 1998:4   0.2712 
1999:1 / 2002:4   0.0707 
 
  36II.3 – Filtered Coefficients of α1,t – IPA 
 
DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate  DATE  Coefficient 
Filtered Estimate 
1980-1  0.8895  1987-4  0.8348  1995-3  0.8796 
1980-2  0.8895  1988-1  0.9677  1995-4  0.8856 
1980-3  0.8947  1988-2  0.9313  1996-1  0.8857 
1980-4  0.8908  1988-3  1.0106  1996-2  0.8862 
1981-1  0.8783  1988-4  0.9829  1996-3  0.8889 
1981-2  0.8655  1989-1  0.8009  1996-4  0.8863 
1981-3  0.8688  1989-2  0.6956  1997-1  0.8867 
1981-4  0.8939  1989-3  1.3409  1997-2  0.8854 
1982-1  0.9078  1989-4  0.7006  1997-3  0.8868 
1982-2  0.8897  1990-1  1.3730  1997-4  0.8864 
1982-3  0.8871  1990-2  0.4938  1998-1  0.8857 
1982-4  0.8664  1990-3  0.8160  1998-2  0.8874 
1983-1  0.8993  1990-4  0.9189  1998-3  0.8857 
1983-2  0.9068  1991-1  0.7605  1998-4  0.8866 
1983-3  0.9495  1991-2  0.6860  1999-1  0.8934 
1983-4  0.9780  1991-3  0.9356  1999-2  0.6588 
1984-1  0.9097  1991-4  0.8791  1999-3  0.9353 
1984-2  0.9202  1992-1  0.5981  1999-4  0.8755 
1984-3  0.9310  1992-2  1.0506  2000-1  0.8920 
1984-4  0.9626  1992-3  0.9564  2000-2  0.8817 
1985-1  0.8816  1992-4  1.0820  2000-3  0.8913 
1985-2  0.8319  1993-1  0.9528  2000-4  0.8882 
1985-3  0.8974  1993-2  1.0176  2001-1  0.8697 
1985-4  0.9112  1993-3  1.0407  2001-2  0.8887 
1986-1  0.8956  1993-4  1.0437  2001-3  0.8383 
1986-2  0.6583  1994-1  1.0076  2001-4  0.8656 
1986-3  0.9227  1994-2  0.9711  2002-1  0.8949 
1986-4  0.8820  1994-3  0.6012  2002-2  0.8863 
1987-1  0.8942  1994-4  0.6700  2002-3  0.8860 
1987-2  1.0067  1995-1  0.9480  2002-4  0.8304 
1987-3  0.6892  1995-2  0.8685    
Period Mean 
1980:1 / 1994:2    0.9034 
1994:3 / 1998:1    0.8606 
1999:1 / 2002:4    0.8673 
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